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Abstract. If politicians and their advisers want to promote the well-being or happiness of 
citizens they have three ways to find out what they should do. (1) They can analyse the 
behaviour and the decisions of citizens to find out what they want, in other words: they can 
try to identify their “revealed preferences”. This is common practice in economics. (2) They 
can analyse the “stated preferences” of people as they express them explicitly in inquiries, 
referenda, polls and elections. (3) They can analyse the conditions that make people happy by 
comparing the conditions of people at different levels of happiness. Economists, like Helen 
Johns and Paul Ormerod, have an outspoken preference for the first option and they are 
sceptical about the third. Their argument is unbalanced because they are too critical about 
the authenticity and complexity of self-reported happiness and not critical enough about the 
authenticity and complexity of revealed preferences. Economists should appreciate the 
comparative advantages and additional value of each option and try to find optimal 
combinations with synergistic effects. Economists should appreciate happiness research as an 
option to assess the nature and magnitude of “externalities” within their own discipline. 
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Helen Johns and Paul Ormerod are both economists with a lot of experience in research and 
consultancy. They are critical of self-reported happiness research and its significance for 
policy-development. They summarized their objections in a concise, but deeply cutting book. 
Their criticism is based on the following arguments. 
 
1. Johns and Ormerod observe that average self-reported happiness in nations is 
insensitive to important developments. We see hardly any change in time-series for 
average happiness in nations, whilst there have been important developments in 
variables like Gross National Product (GNP), public expenditure, life-expectancy, 
violent crime, income-inequality and gender equality (p. 34-38). The absence of any 
substantial impact of increasing GNP has been extensively discussed in research on 
happiness, but the lack of any substantial impact of other factors has been seriously 
neglected. 
2. Johns and Ormerod conclude that we face a dilemma: either we conclude that 
attempting to improve the human lot is futile, or we conclude that self-reported 
happiness over time is an extremely insensitive measure of well-being. In their view 
the evidence points to the latter. The first option is not acceptable for Johns and 
Ormerod; as they say on p. 34 and 35: “…what would be the point of all those schools 
and hospitals? What would be the point of all these dedicated public servants? More 
public spending has not led to increases in happiness.” 
3. Johns and Ormerod also notice that self-reported happiness is based on different 
individual events and conditions. This makes it difficult to assess the impact of 
specific events and conditions. They conclude that ex-post analysis is therefore 
vulnerable to misinterpretations and manipulation. They fear that introducing the 
conclusions of happiness research in policy-decisions can produce unethical decisions 
and patronage. Marriage and religious faith have a positive impact on happiness and 
cultural heterogeneity has a negative impact. Such conclusions could justify the 
reduction of incentives for single parents, the promotion of religious faith and ethnic 
cleansing (p. 48, 70).  
4. Johns and Ormerod find that revealed or stated individual preferences should never be 
overruled by conclusions about self-reported happiness. Referring to Kahneman 
(2002) and Smith (2002) they admit (p. 26) that people do not act as if they were 
maximising their utility by problems like bounded rationality and lack of information 
(Akerlof, 2002). They admit that economics need different postulates on individual 
behaviour from the conventional one of utility maximisation (p. 27).  In that context 
they appreciate happiness-research as a useful part of the modern research program in 
economics. But happiness research suggests that individual preferences are not fixed 
and this is a bridge too far for Johns and Ormerod; as they say on page 27: “ … once 
preferences are allowed to vary over time, the postulate that individuals take the best 
possible decision given their preferences loses much of its meaning”. They obviously 
fear that this could lead to a lack of respect for the individual free will. As they put it 
on page 68: “In fact, given that government policy appraisal already does include 
environmental and other non-market benefits, the dichotomy that the use of well-being 
research throws up is not that of a holistic versus a materialistic conception of welfare, 
rather it is between accepting individual preferences as a reasonable indicator of 
welfare and not doing so”.  
5. Johns and Ormerod prefer GNP as a better measure for average welfare and well-
being. First of all because it is based on individual preferences, but also because GNP-
research has an established tradition and a good record of reliable and informative 
results (p. 59). The idea that GNP needs to be supplemented by some measure of 
‘gross national happiness’ is in their view similar to arguments for modifying GNP to 
account for negative effects not incorporated in prices (externalities). How such an 
indicator would actually produce better decisions is, in their view, rarely spelt out in 





Happiness is not insensitive and rising around the world  
Johns and Ormerod’s argument that self-reported happiness in nations is stable and insensitive 
is not in line with empirical data. As demonstrated by Veenhoven and Hagerty (2006), and 
Inglehart, Foa, Peterson and Welzel (2008) there are fluctuations in self-reported happiness 
and there is a general upward trend. According to data from the World Values Surveys people 
in most nations are happier than before. During the past 26 years the World Values Surveys 
have asked people how happy they are, using the same two questions: “Taking all things 
together, would you say you are very happy, rather happy, not very happy, not at all happy” 
And: “All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?”. 
Combining the answers to these two questions, Inglehart and colleagues constructed an index 
of subjective well-being that reflects both happiness and general life satisfaction. In the 52 
nations for which substantial time series are available from 1981 to 2007, this index rose in 40 
nations and fell in only 12. The average percentage of people who said they were “very 
happy” increased by almost seven points. Economic growth, democratization and rising social 
tolerance have contributed to this rising happiness.  
 
Sensitive and rising, but what about an upper limit? 
Self-reported happiness probably has an upper limit, obviously not because popular scales 
have limited categories, but in reality. Emotions are essential for happiness and can be very 
positive or negative, but not unlimited in either direction. In as far as happiness is cognitive 
there are other barriers: our ideas about our best and worst possible life. Such ideas always 
depend on knowledge about actual possibilities with limited variety. The existence of a 
theoretical maximum opens up the possibility that individuals and nations achieve maximum 
happiness in reality. Will self-reported happiness become insensitive to positive 
developments, once this maximum is reached?  Perhaps it is like the Olympic Games: the 
records become sharper and breaking records will require more efforts. But it will be possible 
and the games will continue! In terms of every-day life and sheer logic however, Johns and 
Ormerod might have a point: if happiness is at its maximum it becomes insensitive to positive 
developments, even if such developments are deeply appreciated by large numbers of citizens. 
For the time being it is not a serious handicap. Most individuals and nations are not at their 
maximum, and even if they are it will be informative to compare them in cross-sectional 
analysis with individuals and nations at lower levels. 
 
 
Experience-sampling will support the analysis of self-reported happiness 
It is important to make a distinction between two types of subjective well-being. Self-reported 
happiness is about the appreciation of life as a whole, based on the ex post evaluation of many 
different positive and negative events and conditions. Reporting such happiness requires some 
cognitive reflection and is therefore influenced by complicated mechanisms, like social 
comparison. The analysis of such ex post self-reported happiness is therefore complicated 
indeed. Daily emotions and moods, on the other hand, are spontaneous and directly connected 
to immediate events and conditions. Such emotional experiences are assessed in experience-
sampling, as described by Csikzentmihalyi and Hunter (2003). Brain-research (MRI) is an 
interesting new development in this field. Experience-sampling is promising because it can 
identify the relationships between specific situations and emotions. Experience-sampling can 
also produce a better understanding of the relationship between emotions and self-reported 
happiness. Daniel Kahneman has formulated one way to start this job: measuring “objective 
happiness” in a relevant period by assessing “subjective happiness” or instant utility at 
different moments within that period (Kahneman, 2003). It will take time and money, but 
there is no reason for pessimism! Johns and Ormerod overlook this important distinction 
between the analysis of self-reported happiness and experience-sampling. As a consequence 
they underestimate the potential support for self-reported happiness-research by experience-
sampling. Before we continue this evaluation of self-reported happiness, as an indicator for 
average well-being, we consider revealed and stated preferences as alternative indicators. 
 
Revealed and stated preferences, exit and voice! 
Revealed preferences are preferences revealed in actual decisions and behaviour. Revealed 
preferences, in particular in economic decisions, are the dominant source of information in 
economics. GNP is interpreted as the actualisation of revealed preferences, as expressed in 
market-prices. Revealed preferences are informative about actual choices people make, their 
behaviour on markets, and their real priorities. A problem is the fact that revealed preferences 
depend on the actual supply of goods and services, the knowledge and disposable budgets of 
consumers, the honesty of producers, and the transparency of markets in general. 
Stated preferences are the opinions people express about issues in general, but not necessarily 
issues they have to deal with in practice. Stated preferences speak for themselves and need 
relatively little additional interpretation and analysis. They are, therefore, the least vulnerable 
to manipulation. The weakness of stated preferences is that they also depend on the 
knowledge of respondents and that they are not binding: people can say whatever they like 
without personal consequences. A vote in free elections is a specific type of a stated 
preference. 
The distinction between revealed and stated preferences is very similar to the distinction 
between two “feed-back-mechanisms”, made by A. Hirschman (1972): “exit” and “voice”. 
People can react in two ways if they have complaints about anything: they can refuse it and/or 
choose something else, or they can communicate their complaints to the people who are 
responsible for the things of which they disapprove. Both mechanisms are useful for 
everybody, including managers, politicians, policy-makers, employers, shop-keepers, and  
(ex-)husbands!  
 
Pros and cons of self-reported happiness, compared to revealed and stated preferences 
Now we can summarize the most prominent pros and cons of self-reported happiness 
compared to revealed or stated preferences, as indicators for average well-being. Self-reported 
happiness is in particular informative about the actual impact on happiness of general 
conditions, like economic growth, democracy, tolerance, trust, governance, economic freedom 
and gender equality. The analysis of self-reported happiness is complicated since happiness is 
indeed affected by many different conditions. This complexity is a disadvantage compared to 
stated preferences about specific options, because the analysis of such stated preferences is 
relatively simple. It is however not a disadvantage compared to preferences revealed in actual 
behaviour, because the interpretation and analysis of such behaviour is equally complicated. 
For this reason stated preferences are the least vulnerable for manipulation. One practical 
point: collecting information about happiness and stated preferences is relatively cheap, since 
it can be done by asking rather simple questions. Collecting information about revealed 
preferences –by national statistical agencies- is more complicated and expensive. In a 
nutshell: research of revealed preferences is important because it is about actual behaviour, 
but it is complicated and expensive; research of self-reported happiness is complicated but 
cheap; research of stated preferences is simple ánd cheap, but stated preferences depend on 
knowledge just like revealed preferences, and they are non-committal. Self-reported 
happiness has therefore one important advantage compared to stated ánd revealed preferences: 
it is not dependent on the knowledge of people about specific options or about the conditions 
that make them happy. This is important because people have only limited knowledge of the 
conditions that make them happy, as has been nicely demonstrated by Gilbert in his 
“Stumbling on Happiness” (Gilbert 2007). For short: all indicators have specific advantages 
and additional value. Coming back to Johns and Ormerod: their book is somewhat unbalanced 
because they are very critical about the authenticity and complexity of self-reported happiness 
and not critical enough about of the authenticity and complexity of revealed and stated 
preferences. 
 
Do we need self-reported happiness as an indicator for well-being, in addition to GNP? 
It follows from the discussion of pros and cons that GNP, stated preferences and self reported 
happiness have their own specific merits. All have additional value and combinations produce 
synergistic effects. The fact that GNP-research has a more established tradition, and so far 
perhaps a better record of reliable results, cannot change this conclusion. We might even go 
one step further. If we consider the aggregated value of goods and services in market prices as 
the only determinant of well-being, then we only need GNP as an indicator for well-being. 
But most economists, Johns and Ormerod included, accept the existence of “externalities”, 
determinants of well-being which are not properly incorporated in market-prices and GNP. 
For that reason economists should appreciate the analysis of self-reported happiness as an 
option to identify such determinants and measure their impact. Economists should, in other 
words, appreciate the analysis of self-reported happiness as an option to assess the nature and 
magnitude of the “externalities” within their own discipline! 
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